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Understanding the Appeal of the 
Taliban in Pakistan
By Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
Introduction
The past six years, since 2004, have witnessed a significant rise in inci-
dents of terrorism in Pakistan. The writ of the state has been directly chal-
lenged by the rise of many extremist, militant groups, who have 
transmigrated from Pakistan's tribal areas. These groups have assumed 
control of large areas in Pakistan, like Swat in Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, 
still popularly known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The 
momentum of this extremism is marked by an unprecedented alacrity, 
organizational capability, and impunity to engage the state militarily. 
Scholarship has not kept pace with terrorism, and is in a nascent stage in 
Pakistan, with little understanding and research among researchers, ana-
lysts, and policymakers into the drivers of extremism. Among the possible 
factors giving rise to terrorism in Pakistan, poverty and poor social indica-
tors figure prominently.
This article briefly explores the economics of the "Talibanization" of Paki-
stan within descriptive and contextual paradigms, while attempting to 
find a best solution to counter rising militancy in the context of realities 
facing the population on the ground. One such solution is the National 
Pakistani Counter Terrorism and Extremism Strategy (NACTES), 
designed to curb Taliban financing in Pakistan. The strategy is being 
drafted by National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), the nascent 
homeland security coordination body set up by the state as the primary 
public organ entrusted with counterterrorism, counter-extremism, and 
de-radicalization efforts of the state.
There are several defining characteristics that need to be explored to put 
this extremist movement in perspective. First, the Taliban have attempted 
to win the sympathies of target populations by exploiting the lacunae in 
distributive social justice, thereby bypassing the framework of local 
governance. The result has been improvised local economic "pumps" 
catering to the masses, particularly the landless poor. Second, they have 
utilized an ingenious blend of natural resources that supplements or 
perhaps even equals outside donor funding; this implies that they have 
adroitly taken over whatever resources they could appropriate in areas 
under their control. Third, they have managed to augment their income 
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with funds generated from organized criminal activities. Last, but not 
least, the informal money exchange systems in Pakistan and the various 
Islamist trusts are quite active in Pakistan, notwithstanding state-
enforced bans and crackdowns.
Rural Poverty and Talibanization
Rural poverty is a major destabilizing factor in Pakistan, with approxi-
mately two-thirds of Pakistani people living in rural areas.1 Authoritative 
studies have documented higher poverty levels in Pakistan with decreased 
capacity to acquire and hold land, which is the main source of subsistence 
in the agricultural areas of Pakistan.2 Nearly 67 percent of Pakistani 
households are landless,3 though this is not the sole denominator of pov-
erty in Pakistan.4 The problem is thrown into sharp relief by comparison 
to the decline in India's rural poverty during 1987–2000.5 The compari-
son is pertinent since both countries inherited a nearly identical system of 
land holdings and feudalism after independence, which India ostensibly 
seems to have tackled better than Pakistan; the latter seems to have alter-
nated between monetary policies dictated by the IMF and World Bank, 
and its own experiments with land reforms, which proved deleterious.6 
The income disparity between the "haves" and "have-nots" in Pakistan 
has also increased significantly during the same period, while income dis-
parity has largely become an urban phenomenon in the period under 
review.7, 8
Rural poverty declined in Pakistan through the 1970s and '80s, but 
increased steadily during the 1990s. Strikingly, poverty levels tend to 
decrease in inverse proportion to land holding, where poverty virtually 
disappears with holdings of fifty-five acres and above. The scope of the 
poverty is alarming; nearly 67 percent of households owned no land, 
according to an officially sanctioned study conducted in 2004.9 For exam-
ple, in 2004, 18.25 percent of households owned less than five acres of 
land, and 9.66 percent of households owned five to twelve and a half acres 
of land. This meant that very large extended families had to rely on mea-
ger incomes from this land as the sole source of income. The pattern is 
dismally skewed towards a few feudal families holding large land hold-
ings; barely 1 percent (0.64 percent plus 0.37 percent) of households dur-
ing this time frame owned more than thirty-five acres of land. This is 
reinforced by the Gini coefficient of land holding,10 which was very high 
at 0.6151 (zero corresponds to perfect equality) in 2001–02. Thus, the 
problem is not just lower levels of land holding in Pakistan, but also 
highly unequal land distribution that has resulted in a wealthy minority 
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class that owns land and the vast majority that does not. This indicates 
that poverty and landlessness are directly related to each other in rural 
Pakistan.
As for spatial distribution of landlessness, 86 percent of households were 
landless in Sindh (landless plus non-agriculture), followed by 78 percent 
in Balochistan and 74 percent in Punjab. Evidence of income disparity in 
Pakistani society is bolstered by statistics, with the Lorenz curve of 2001–
02 for Pakistan lying below the 1984–85 levels.11, 12 This indicates that 
income distribution patterns gradually worsened, resulting in higher 
income inequality in 2001–02 relative to 1984–85.13 Greater changes are 
visible in the higher part of the income distribution curves than in the 
middle and lower part of income brackets. This stipulates that in 2001–
02, the upper income brackets registered a gain in income share to the 
richest 20 percent at the expense of the poorest 20 percent and middle 60 
percent, which obviously increased the poverty levels in the lower and 
middle brackets. This projection also points out the dismal fact that the 
richest one percent who used to get 10 percent of total income in 1984–
85, would be getting almost 20 percent of the total income in Pakistan in 
2001–02. All of this has tended to create a class divide between have and 
have-nots in Pakistan, and has ushered in a feeling of lack of social justice 
in the society, which has facilitated the indoctrination for Talibanization.
The Correlation between Social Justice and 
Extremism
As espoused by Maulana Maudoodi, a famous Islamic scholar from Paki-
stan, jihad is a binding duty of all Muslims. To perform this duty properly, 
Muslims must begin jihad first by correcting themselves (Amar bil-
ma`ruf), and then move on to correcting others through instructions 
(Nahi `an al-munkar). One enters into a war only if the justification of 
jihad makes it necessary. For example, the Taliban presumably used jihad 
as an instrument of correction in Afghanistan to implement penal laws to 
exert control of unruly elements in the society. The modern Pakistani Tal-
iban has done the same; even when Pakistani military operations were 
proceeding against them, they were engaged in organizing penal punish-
ments against offenders. Certainly, Baitullah Mehsud, the now deceased 
Taliban leader in Pakistan, along with Fazlullah, his deputy in Swat, 
engaged in these tactics and transformed a once peaceful Pakistani area 
into a militant haven.
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The unemployment rate for the age group fifteen to twenty-five years in 
Waziristan is above 80 percent, and could be a significant contributor of 
militancy in the tribal areas of Pakistan. With such abysmal statistics, it is 
not a stretch to imagine that unemployed youths may be attracted to mili-
tancy as a way of venting their grievances. The inherent structural imbal-
ances in distributive social justice in Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) in Pakistan have left gaping wounds, which the extremists are 
quick to exploit. The NWFP, and FATA in particular, have tended to feel 
left out of Pakistani development processes. A World Bank report on the 
NWFP clearly documented widespread poverty, a provincial GDP which 
was only 60 percent of the national GDP, and achievement in the educa-
tion and health sectors well below the national average.14 It had the high-
est infant mortality rate in Pakistan of fifty-six deaths per 1000 live births. 
Only 58 percent of total households received clean drinking water. The 
NWFP does not get its fair share even in the judicially determined shares 
of the governmental gross net profits.15 The FATA areas fare even worse.
Examples of Exploitation by the Taliban from Everyday Life
Several examples illustrate how the militants try to fill the socioeconomic 
vacuum. Hussein Khan, who owns a pharmacy in Wana, the capital of 
South Waziristan, praised Baitullah for some of his "good acts." Khan 
mused that Baitullah had "restored law and order in the area. Robbers 
and thieves have left the area fearing harsh punishments."16 According to 
Khan, "Some people also believe that there are many bad people in his 
militia," citing the killing of thirteen family members of the federal gov-
ernment's political agent in Khyber Agency, an adjacent tribal area, in an 
armed attack by Baitullah's militia about four months earlier. "He (Baitul-
lah) publicly apologized for the incident," Khan said. "The Taliban 
involved in the attack have been languishing in (his) jail for the last four 
months. They would have been punished if anti-security sentiments 
against military action had not been aroused and [the] military option 
had not been exercised."17
Aslam Awan, a journalist working with the jihadist publication Weekly 
Takbeer, mentions the establishment of a "special task force" in June 
2007 to crack down on criminals in South Waziristan. "This force 
launched a number of crackdowns and made feared kidnapper Abdul 
Rashid Bakakhel free some of his hostages. Baitullah also collected 
donations from the local people to establish peace. It was a kind of 
protection money," Awan continues.18 In the Taliban stronghold of Swat, 
Baitullah's equally radical deputy Fazlullah attempted to portray himself 
as a type of Robin Hood, establishing law and order through extreme and 
often brutal measures with the support of local populations.19 Public 
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lashings in Mamdheray, Fazlullah's militant headquarters, resonate to the 
media images emanating from Afghanistan during the Taliban heyday.20
The Appeal of the Taliban
Unfortunately, many of these acts are endorsed by the local populace, 
since these are seen as non-discriminatory acts by the Taliban aimed at 
punishing criminals masquerading as Taliban and committing acts of 
robbery. In areas where the locals have traditionally complained of inef-
fective governance by successive governments, which allegedly indulged 
in nepotism and inadequate resource allocation, a heightened sense of 
insecurity may be a driving factor swelling the ranks of Taliban followers. 
This suggests that in a closed society (like Waziristan), which is seques-
tered from the mainstream society at large, there is a complex interplay of 
different centrifugal forces which need to be researched in their context. 
The amount of aid and government resource allocation, for example, 
needs to be accounted for in these areas to appreciate the dynamics of the 
process. On the other hand, Marc Sagemen suggests that the common-
place stereotypical conception of penniless,21 opportunity-denied Muslim 
youths turning to violence is not necessarily true. Instead, the desire to 
reconstruct, or put more suitably, deconstruct the existing society for a 
more egalitarian one drives some of the population to extreme acts such 
as suicide bombing.
Swat, which had a thriving hospitality industry, deteriorated into a mili-
tant haven within a few years. Swat was until very recently a prosperous 
area with a laissez-faire attitude toward religion. Perhaps the absence of 
distributive social justice and the remnants of feudalism in the form of the 
Maliks (local tribal leaders) in Swat had an effect on promoting militancy. 
Some analysts opine that the social vacuum generated by the apathy of 
the Maliks toward the conditions of the peasant class, and the dearth of 
provisions for obtaining speedy justice from courts, prompted the locals 
to pledge allegiance to Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi 
(TNSM), the radical movement in the area which spawned Talibanization. 
TNSM advocated for reforms in the shape of shar'ia.22 TNSM gradually 
became unpopular as the movement lost steam, and the Taliban neatly 
stepped in as an effective substitute. This analysis is bolstered by the fact 
that the Taliban movement initially became popular in the rural areas of 
Khawazakhela, Matta, and Kabal; all three areas were characterized by a 
strong feudal system and what is widely considered to be downtrodden 
peasantry.23 It is only after the Taliban had consolidated their hold in 
these relatively less affluent localities that they started speeding in 
strength to other more prosperous areas like Babozai and Barikot.
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Thus, the Taliban seems to start as grassroots movements in feudal 
dominated areas, which is perhaps the main reason why they have not 
been able to gain a stronghold in the neighboring district of Buner. Buner 
is characterized by an absence of the feudal system of Maliks, and 
paradoxically, a poorly developed system of agriculture as opposed to 
Swat.24 If poverty alone is considered as the main variable in generating 
militancy in these areas, then Buner should have been the district giving 
birth to the phenomenon of Talibanization since it is nearly identical 
topographically to Swat except for being poorer. However, the 
distinguishing feature of Buner—the absence of feudalism—has perhaps 
saved the area from Talibanization.
Funding the Taliban
Even with popular support, without commensurate funding, militant 
organizations like the Taliban in Pakistan would not be able to survive. 
There are commonalities shared by the systems of money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Both criminals and terrorists try to exploit loopholes 
in legitimate financial systems to gain their ends, underlying which is the 
need to hide their activities. These activities are usually carried out in 
permissive environments with lax financial oversight from banking 
authorities, poor due diligence processes to "know the customers," and 
absent or poor comprehension of warning flags which should raise 
suspicion of illicit activity. Terrorist financing is also often referred to as 
reverse money laundering as it focuses on utilizing legal assets to carry 
out terrorist activities, which are often in the form of clean sources such as 
charitable organizations and legitimate business organizations. Since the 
terrorist organizations are now loosely decentralized, they are evolving in 
their ability to source, store, move, as well as use funds in innovative 
ways. Irrespective of the evolving means of sourcing and using funds, a 
substantial portion of terrorist funds still goes through the formal 
banking system.
Militant entities in Pakistan have turned aside from state sponsors to 
other alternative sources of funding, including wealthy Arab benefactors 
in the Middle East including the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
While the Taliban get most of their funding from a global network of 
informal funders and sympathizers, they likely continue to receive fund-
ing from sympathetic state players in the Muslim world. This has always 
tended to be a very shadowy affair, with very little information coming out 
into the open. However, such a picture is not at all complete without the 
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interpolation of Taliban funding generated by utilizing charities, covert 
"feeder" fronts, drug trade, taxation, crime, and natural resources like 
gemstones, timber, and marble.
Islamist Trusts
In order to facilitate money transfers from donors, many businesses and 
banks are used as "fronts," enabling militant organizations to receive 
money in the name of income transfers. In the mid-1990s, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that fifty Islamic charities "support 
terrorist groups or employ individuals who are suspected of having terror-
ist connections."25 The militant organizations are extremely careful about 
their financial matters; in its famous military manual, Declaration of 
Jihad against the Country's Tyrants, al-Qaida instructs its cadres about 
handling money; the same principles have ostensibly been used by mili-
tant organizations in Pakistan, including the Taliban.
"The group follows five financial security principles: funds should 
be divided between those invested for financial return and the 
balance—operational funds—that should be saved and spent only 
on operations; operational funds should not all be put in one 
place; only a few of the organization's members should know the 
location of its funds; while carrying large amounts of money pre-
cautions should be taken; and money should be left with non-
members and spent only when needed."26
Militant organizations in Pakistan have tended to depend heavily on the 
hawala informal banking system, whereby funds are transferred on a per-
sonal guarantee of the sender, bypassing governmental scrutiny or 
accountability. Pakistani bankers have estimated that the hawala system 
accounted for $2.5 to $3 billion entering the country each year until 2002, 
compared to only $1 billion via the formal banking system. For instance, 
in Pakistan alone there were over 1,000 hawaladars or informal money 
transferors in 2002, some dealing in amounts as large as $10 million.27 
Even though the hawala system has decreased in importance in the wake 
of the Pakistani Government's crackdown, it continues as a viable source 
of income for the Taliban. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
charity money raised overseas by expatriate Pakistanis, and sent home on 
the personal guarantee of a hawaladar. Trust funds and charities are all 
important in this context.
Pakistan does not have laws in place which suffice as anti-terror financing 
legislation; the closest laws are the Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance 
2007, promulgated by the former President of Pakistan, Pervez Mushar-
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raf. This law is inadequate since it does not cover terrorism financing, 
though it does have provisions for a Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) to 
be established within the State Bank. This is largely a placebo, since the 
FMU has not actively started functioning as of Spring 2010. Terrorist 
money laundering is recognized as a non-cognizable offence, which 
means that the police are not allowed to launch a case or carry out arrests 
of their own accord. All these legal lacunae have only added to the difficul-
ties in tracing money flows generated and channeled by the militant orga-
nizations, including the Taliban.
The Link between Crime and Militancy in Pakistan
Raising money from criminal activities has also been a forte of militant 
organizations in Pakistan; the Taliban are not loath to utilize this method 
either. Ostensibly, such activities in a Dar-ul-Harb (house of war) are 
perceived to be legal. This distorted ideology legitimizes many of the ille-
gal actives carried out by the Taliban and allied jihadist organizations in 
Pakistan. Funds raised for their campaign have been projected to be in 
excess of one billion rupees (~$12 million) over the past two years 
alone.28 In the wake of the Pakistani Government's post-9/11 clampdown 
on jihadist organizations, jihadist assets were frozen, and a lot of fund-
raising infrastructure was demolished under American pressure. Ineffec-
tive fundraising meant that the militants had to invest in speculative 
agricultural and commercial real estate investments as alternatives, which 
produced huge profits.
Enforced bans meant that these properties could not be purchased in the 
names of the organizations, so they were registered to members deputed 
to be "trustees." Since this made the trustees the legal owners, many of 
them legally took possession of the property and sold it to bona fide pur-
chasers and fled with large fortunes to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. 
A severe economic crunch and the bursting of the property bubble, how-
ever, meant that these sources of money eventually dried up as well. For 
want of an alternative, many of these groups turned to crime, since it did 
not carry any perceivable stigma, ostensibly being committed for "higher" 
causes. This is not just speculation—for example, Badshah Deen Mehsud, 
a close aide of Baitullah Mehsud, was arrested in Karachi in 2009 on 
charges of masterminding kidnappings for ransom, robberies, and hijack-
ings.29 All the money from these activities tended to end in the militants' 
kitty; Badshah ran a huge organization in Karachi which was organized 
more like a top-down mafia organization, with squads operating in spe-
cially targeted areas. Badshah's son Meharban Mehsud was also heading a 
large organization, which was allegedly involved in raising funds through 
criminal activities for the Taliban movement.
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The story of Muhammad Farhan Qasim is also instructive; he was 
arrested in connection with several high profile kidnappings for ransom 
involving millions of rupees (hundreds of thousands of dollars).30 Farhan 
confessed to Karachi police that he had carried out these crimes at the 
behest of Baitullah Mehsud, for the purpose of Taliban's "Jihad." And it is 
not simply money that is in demand; interestingly, several members of 
Tehreek-e-Islami, Sirajuddin Haqqani's organization, were arrested steal-
ing walkie-talkies and laptops from electronics shops in Karachi in 
December 2006.31 These were reportedly passed on to Mullah Dadullah, a 
top Taliban commander in Afghanistan, now deceased, through interme-
diaries. The Karachi-based Balochi group Jundullah, which allegedly has 
ties to al-Qaida and the Taliban in the FATA, and Tehreek-e-Islami main-
tain overlapping links with organized criminal mafias.
Jizya (Poll Tax)
Jizya is an important source of Taliban revenue, which is a poll tax levied 
on non-Muslim minorities living under Islamic rule, and sanctioned by 
shar'ia law or, in this case, the Taliban's version of it. The Sikhs living in 
Orakzai Agency in FATA have faced the brunt of this ruthlessly collected 
tax; as a result, many have emigrated to other areas, in which case their 
property and houses have been appropriated by the Taliban. Sikhs have 
lived in Orakzai Agency for decades, and were well integrated into the 
tribal society. All this ended when the Taliban under Hakeemullah Meh-
sud descended on Orakzai; the Sikhs were subsequently forced to pay 
jizya at gunpoint, with forcible conversion as the only alternative. The 
jizya amounts demanded were exorbitant; initially a hundred million 
rupees were demanded, scaled down to half that amount after negotia-
tions with Sikh elders. The Sikhs were warned that noncompliance with 
the terms of the "agreement" would result in the men being killed and the 
women and children being converted.32
Opium for Cash
As during the Taliban heyday prior to 9/11, opium has become a major 
source of Taliban financing in Afghanistan. With improvements in the 
irrigation system, Afghanistan virtually has the monopoly on global pro-
duction of opium.33 The 2006 harvest alone was estimated at over $3 bil-
lion dollars.34 The revenues in succeeding years have been projected to 
exceed these figures. With Afghanistan currently producing 93 percent of 
the world's opium, it is estimated that almost half of Afghanistan's GDP is 
generated from the opium trade.35 The Taliban in Pakistan differ from 
their Afghan counterparts insofar as opium growing does not figure 
prominently as a direct source of income, because Pakistan produces 
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much lower quantities of opium. On the other hand, opium transit is cer-
tainly big Pakistani Taliban business; some estimates claim that about 90 
percent of Afghan opium passes through North and South Waziristan and 
Bajaur Agency.36 A military officer posted in the counterinsurgency oper-
ation told me in an interview: "(It) seems that these areas have become 
the charas (a colloquial name for hashish, loosely applied to other narcot-
ics) silk route…(probably) the Taliban are controlling this lucrative trade 
through the help of their counterparts across the border…(it is hard) to 
estimate the amount…(perhaps) millions of dollars worth (of produce)."
Natural Resources
The Taliban had a lot of opportunity to boost their funds with the sale of 
marble, after taking over the Ziarat marble quarry in Mohmand Agency in 
FATA in April 2008; FATA is a major producer of marble, with around a 
million tons of marble being mined every year. A substantial amount of 
government input had been projected to increase marble and granite 
exports to $500 million dollars by 2013; this lucrative mining business 
was taken over almost completely by the militants in Mohmand Agency.37
The Taliban next took control of the lucrative government-controlled 
emerald mines in Mingora, Swat. Reportedly, these mines had been occu-
pied by the militants during the Sufi Muhammad brokered peace deal. 
The nearby Shamozai and Gujjar Killi mines were also occupied, and a 
lucrative militant-controlled gem trade ensued, with reportedly a third of 
the profits being shared by the Taliban with the local populace. The lucra-
tive timber trade in the Swat and Dir areas was also taken over by the Tal-
iban. It is hard to calculate exactly how much the Taliban is gaining from 
the timber trade, but it is estimated that the Government of Pakistan is 
losing 65 billion rupees (nearly $1 billion) annually from the illegal timber 
trade, and the Taliban seems to be the primary beneficiary.
Conclusion
It is challenging and unnecessary to point to any one factor as causal in 
the allure of Talibanization in Pakistan; rather, the Taliban has shrewdly 
exploited the grievances of rural, impoverished populations suffering 
from social injustice and unequal land distribution. Furthermore, the Tal-
iban has ingeniously generated income through organized crime, taxes, 
and classic money-laundering schemes, while simultaneously providing 
short-term "peace" and stability from local "criminal" entities.
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As Marc Sagemen has suggested, poverty is not an exclusive driver of 
extremist violence. The greatest appeal of the Taliban is the desire of Mus-
lim youths to create a more egalitarian society. The appeal of the Taliban 
to local populations is that they are able to "right the wrong"—even resort-
ing to brutal tactics to achieve their objectives. There are no sanctioned 
institutions that offer due process as an alternative remedy to perceived 
problems in these rural communities. Thus, the corrupting influence of 
Taliban ideology in the absence of responsible governance has widespread 
appeal. Some benign grassroots movements have driven people to 
extreme acts such as suicide bombing as a means to alleviate the burden 
of social injustice on behalf of the greater society.
Financially, the Taliban has vehemently denied getting any help from 
outside the country, even though the Government of Pakistan has been 
quick to point fingers at foreign hands. The militants have tended to 
assert ownership of their movement as a home grown movement, rather 
than foreigner-directed unrest.
While foreign sources of funding contribute to the Taliban's treasuries, 
the Taliban has ingeniously improvised indigenous methods of raising 
money in their own environmental contexts. The Taliban has used coer-
cive tactics to extort money in the name of jizya. Where natural resources 
were present in the form of emerald mines in Mingora or marble quarries 
in Mohmand Agency, these were taken over as lucrative sources of 
income. The doctrine of necessity has been invoked by the Taliban as a 
justification for generating funds by crime, particularly in the bustling 
commercial metropolis of Karachi.
All this income generation is supplemented by income sent from overseas 
in the form of donations sent by sympathizers and organizational opera-
tives. This radical "remittance" is still largely invisible to financial over-
sight bodies in Pakistan because it is channeled through informal money 
laundering networks. Islamist trusts and charities also generate money 
for the Taliban. Even though many such trusts have been banned in Paki-
stan and around the world, they have re-branded themselves as secular 
entities. This trend has been overlooked by law enforcement authorities in 
Pakistan, which traditionally have given these trusts and charities consid-
erable leeway.
Thus, the highly flexible money raising infrastructure of the Taliban in 
Pakistan has to be recognized in the context of being tailored to its own 
indigenous environment, and local stakeholders have to be involved in the 
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process of curbing terrorist financing. All these facets have to be recog-
nized in the context of an overarching strategy, such as the NACTES cur-
rently under deliberation by the Government of Pakistan.
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